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 ARTICLE  
 The role of dignity in equality law: 
Lessons from Canada and South Africa 
 Rory  O’Connell * 
 This paper examines the link made on occasion between the concept of dignity and 
substantive equality; it is further noted that dignity can have very different meanings 
in different contexts. While the notion of dignity does not often play a substantive role 
in the resolution of decisions, sometimes the underlying understanding of dignity does 
matter. However, in all cases, judges should avoid the temptation to rely on unarticulated 
value judgments or subjective notions of dignity. When judges make reference to 
dignity, they should articulate the values underpinning their conception of it. 
 Introduction: Empty vessels and unassailable concepts 
 Equality is a difﬁ cult concept. The chief justice of Canada labels it the  “ most dif-
ﬁ cult right, ” 1 and courts in many different jurisdictions have found grappling 
with it a challenge. In the United States, an apparently clear three-tier method 
for dealing with equal protection law has been confounded by the emergence of 
the  “ rational scrutiny with bite ” 2 and  “ sliding scale ” 3 approaches to equal pro-
tection. 4 Canada has seen repeated efforts since the 1990s to deﬁ ne an approach 
to equality; nonetheless, an apparent reconciliation of views in 1999 5 has not 
prevented serious disagreement among judges as to the application of the 
 * Lecturer in human rights, Human Rights Centre, School of Law. Queen’s University of Belfast. I am grateful to 
colleagues in the Human Rights Centre, Queen’s University of Belfast, and to Fiona O’Connell and participants 
at the Equality and Social Inclusion conference in Queen’s, February 2006, for comments on an earlier draft. 
Responsibility for any inadequacies is mine alone. Email:  r.oconnell@qub.ac.uk 
 1  Beverly McLachlin,  Equality: The Most Difﬁ cult Right, 14  SUP. CT. L. REV. 17 (2001). 
 2  The term is coined in Gerald Gunther,  The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86  HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). For 
an application see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 3  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973) (Marshall. J., dissenting), City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 4  For a contrast of the U.S. and Canadian approaches to equality, see Claire L’Heureux-Dube,  Real-
izing Equality in the Twentieth Century: The Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in Comparative Per-
spective , 1  INT’L. J. CONST. LAW (I • CON) 35 (2003). 
 5  Law v. Canada (Minister of Immigration), [1999] 1.S.R.C. 497.  See Donna Greschner,  Does Law 
Advance the Cause of Equality? , 27  QUEEN ’ S L. J. 299 (2001); Emily Grabham, Law v. Canada:  New 
Directions for Equality under the Canadian Charter , 22  OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD . 641 (2002). 
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equality test. 6 The same is true, if not quite to the same extent, in South Africa, 
where the Constitutional Court, early in its history, set out a test for equality 7 
that has seen important split decisions in its application. 8 
 Some of this controversy may reﬂ ect a point made with vigor by Peter Westen 
in the 1980s — that equality is an essentially empty concept. 9 The formal con-
ception of equality — that likes should be treated in a similar manner and those 
that are unlike treated differently, according to their differences — is, as Westen 
argued, a meaningless concept, since everything depends on the substantive 
rule by which one deﬁ nes what is alike. The emptiness of formal equality makes 
it tempting to ﬂ esh out equality with more substantive concepts. Sandra 
Fredman identiﬁ es speciﬁ c values that can be used to develop a conception of 
equality: distributive justice, remedial aims, participation, and dignity. 10 In this 
unpromising context, some judges and commentators have turned to  “ dignity ” 
to provide guidance. This is especially so in Canada and South Africa (countries 
often suggested as models for equality law), 11 though the concept of dignity has 
also attracted attention from commentators elsewhere; 12 and recent European 
directives on equality refer to the aim of protecting dignity. 13 
 Dignity is an unassailable value, 14 and, as such, it may serve as an irrefutable 
argument. 15 It is also an ambiguous concept, one which conceals very 
different ideas of what constitutes a life with dignity. Despite this ambiguity, 
 6  See, e.g. , Gosselin v. Attorney General of Quebec,  infra note 95, and other cases discussed later for 
examples of strong disagreement among the judges. Some important decisions are not so frac-
tured: Nova Scotia (Workers Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504; Trociuk v. 
Attorney General of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835. 
 7  President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); and  Harksen v. Lane 1997 (11) 
BCLR 1489 (CC), at paras. 50 – 53. 
 8  In  Hugo and  Harksen themselves, but also in  City Council of Pretoria v. Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 
(CC); and  Robinson v. Volks 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
 9  Peter Westen,  The Empty Idea of Equality , 95  HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
 10  SANDRA FREDMAN, INTRODUCTION TO DISCRIMINATION LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2002); Denise Reaume, 
 Discrimination and Dignity , 63  LA. L. REV . 645, 647 (2003). 
 11  Evadne Grant & Joan Small,  Disadvantage and Discrimination: The Emerging Jurisprudence of the 
South African Constitutional Court , 51  NORTHERN IRELAND LEGAL Q. 174 (2000). 
 12  See Gay Moon & Robin Allen,  Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: A Better Route to Equality? , 
 2006 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 610; Gay Moon,  From Equal Treatment to Appropriate Treatment ,  2006 
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 695. 
 13  The Equal Treatment Amendment Directive, Council Directive 2002/73/EC (Sept. 2002) art. 
2.3. 
 14  Roger Gibbins,  How in the World Can You Contest Equal Human Dignity? , 12  NAT’L J. CONST. L. 25 
(2000). 
 15  Dietrich Ritschl,  Can Ethical Maxims be Derived from Theological Concepts of Human Dignity, in  THE 
CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 93 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., Kluwer 
2002). 
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courts have resorted extensively to the concept. 16 It is a constitutional right in 
Germany, 17 Hungary, 18 Israel, 19 and South Africa, 20 among others, 21 while in the 
European Convention on Human Rights the prohibition of  “ inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment ” may be seen as a negative formulation of the right to dignity. 22 In 
some of these jurisdictions, dignity may serve as the springboard for a series of 
rights. 23 Dignity is laid down as a guiding principle in other constitutions 24 and in 
international human rights law, 25 while some scholars discern a commitment to 
dignity in statutory policy. 26 Judges of the U.S. Supreme Court, including Justices 
William Brennan, 27 Antonin Scalia, 28 and Anthony Kennedy, 29 have referred to 
dignity. Whether stated as a right or a principle, dignity may be invoked to justify 
limiting other rights. 30 The focus in this paper is on one speciﬁ c use of dignity — as 
a value used to ground or give direction to the concept of equality. 
 16  David Feldman,  Human Dignity as a Legal Value – Part 1 ,  PUB. L., Winter 1999, at 682; and David 
Feldman , Human Dignity as a Legal Value – Part 2 ,  PUB. L, Spring 2000, at. 61. 
 17  Grundegesetz (GG), art. 1.  See  EDWARD EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY (Praeger 2002); Christian 
Starck,  The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern Constitu-
tions, in  THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY ,  supra note 15. 
 18  A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA (HUNGARY CONST.), art. 54.  See  CATHERINE DUPRE, IMPORTING THE 
LAW IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONS: THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE RIGHT TO HUMAN 
DIGNITY 65 – 86 (Hart 2003). 
 19  Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752 – 1992, 45 LSI 150 (1992) (Isr.). 
 20  S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 10. 
 21  Vicki Jackson,  Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional 
Discourse , 65  MONT. L. REV. 15 (2004). 
 22  Jochen Frowein,  Human Dignity in International Law, in  THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY ,  supra note 
15, at 124 – 129. 
 23  See  DUPRE ,  supra note 18, at 67. 
 24  IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl.;  S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §§1, 7. 
 25  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 1, 22, and 23, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 26  CONOR GEARTY, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 84 – 114 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004). 
 27  Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 – 265 
(1970). 
 28  Criticizing afﬁ rmative action in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting, citing  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (Yale Univ. Press 1975)). 
 29  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down an antisodomy law), discussed in 
Maxine Goodman,  Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84  NEB. L. REV. 740 
(2006).  See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 30  The European Court of Human Rights dismissed a claim that the judicial decision to abolish the 
common law rule that a husband could not rape his wife was inconsistent with the principle that 
criminal laws are nonretrospective. The Court relied upon the serious threat to human dignity 
posed by rape in justifying its decision. C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92, 21 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 363, para. 42 (1995). 
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 Canada and South Africa have detailed constitutional guarantees of equal-
ity. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads: 
 (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the 
right to the equal protection and equal beneﬁ t of the law without dis-
crimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical 
disability. 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that 
has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individ-
uals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical 
disability. Under section 1 of the Charter, a measure that violates section 
15 may still be saved if it satisﬁ es a proportionality test: restrictions on a 
right that can be shown to be necessary to pursue a legitimate state inter-
est are constitutional. 31 
 The Constitution of South Africa provides more guidance on equality. 
Section 9 states: 
 Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection 
and beneﬁ t of the law. 
 Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and 
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or catego-
ries of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be 
taken. 
 The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, preg-
nancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orienta-
tion, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth. 
 No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against any-
one on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (2). National legis-
lation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
 Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (2) 






 31  Section 1 reads:  “ The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstra-
bly justiﬁ ed in a free and democratic society. ” Dickson CJC comments on section 1 in R. v. Oakes, 
[1986] 1 S.R.C. 103. 
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 As in Canada, in principle, a measure that violates this section can be justiﬁ ed 
if it satisﬁ es a proportionality test. 32 
 This paper examines how judges in Canada and South Africa have referred 
to the concept of dignity in developing equality law. The argument is made 
that, in many instances, the concept does not serve a useful legal purpose and, 
moreover, that there are dangers in introducing the ambiguous concept of dig-
nity into equality analysis. 
 1. The meaning of dignity 
 That dignity is difﬁ cult to deﬁ ne is a commonplace. 33 There is a danger in rely-
ing on a reﬂ exive approach to the idea, which could cover almost any imagina-
ble moral or ethical position and be little more than a so-called  “ gut reaction ” 
or an unarticulated reliance on what judges presume to be socially desirable or 
acceptable. 34 
 Dignity has a long history, with antecedents in religious thought 35 and early 
Western philosophy. 36 It has had many different interpretations in that long 
history, including connotations of social status 37 or personal honor. 38 Also 
encompassed within the term is the notion of the dignity of humanity as a 
 32  Section 36.1 of the South African Constitution: 
 1.  The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justiﬁ able in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including 
   a. the nature of the right; 
   b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
   c. the nature and extent of the limitation; 
   d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
   e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 33  See, e.g. ,  FREDMAN ,  supra note 10, 19. 
 34  “ Dignity is said to be vague to the point of vacuous and, therefore, too easily useable to dress up 
decisions based on nothing more than conservative gut reaction or excessive deference to Parlia-
ment. ” Reaume,  supra note 10, at 646, summarizing the views of critics of dignity. 
 35  Perry disputes the possibility of separating  “ dignity ” from religious origins.  MICHAEL PERRY, 
TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, COURTS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). 
 36  Bloch traces it in different guises to the ancient Greeks and Romans, while others specify Cicero 
as a Roman source later made popular by Pufendorf in the seventeenth century.  ERNST BLOCH,  NAT-
URAL LAW AND HUMAN DIGNITY (M.I.T. Press 1988). 
 37  Discussed in Michael Meyer,  Dignity as a Modern Virtue ,  in  THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY ,  supra 
note 15. 
 38  This idea may still be reﬂ ected in defamation or related civil wrongs. 
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species, which is often invoked in discussions of genetics, 39 end-of-life decisions, 
and reproductive technologies. 40 Such a view of dignity may have force even 
after a person’s death 41 or before their birth. 42 
 What is essential to the human species or human nature is controversial. 
For many years, Irish courts limited the application of equality law to distinc-
tions that affected the  “ essential attributes ” of the human person. This pro-
duced some very odd decisions, including a ﬁ rst-instance ruling to the effect 
that excluding women from juries was nondiscriminatory because jury service 
was not an essential human attribute. 43 
 “ Dignity ” may refer to a life that is led according to an ethical ideal of the vir-
tuous or the  “ good life, ” an approach that also may be controversial. Deryck 
Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword give the example of German and French cases 
where courts prohibited peep shows and the carnival practice of dwarf throw-
ing, relying on the notion of dignity; 44 more recently, a French court invoked 
dignity to ban a controversial Benetton ad. 45 In one South African case, judges 
held that prostitution is a diminution of human dignity and violates the princi-
ple that the human body should not be made into a commodity. 46 A substantive 
 39  Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword,  Human Dignity, Human Rights and Human Genetics, 61 
 MOD. L. REV. 661 (1998). 
 40  Feldman,  Human Dignity as a Legal Value – Part 1 ,  supra note 16, at 684. A recent European 
Court of Human Rights case involved a woman who wanted to use stored fertilized ova but was 
prevented from doing so because her estranged husband denied his consent. Dignity was 
invoked both to defend and condemn the restriction in Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
6339/05, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 89 of the judgment and para. 13 of the joint dissenting 
opinion. 
 41  Such a conception of dignity may apply in situations where an individual is dead. As the German 
Federal Constitutional Court puts it:  “ It would be incompatible with the constitutional command-
ment that human dignity is inviolate  … if a person, possessed of human dignity by virtue of his 
personhood, could be degraded or debased  … even after his death. ” Mephisto case, Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BverfG] Feb. 24, 1971, BVerfGE 30, 173,  in  CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 302 – 303 (Donald Kommers, ed., Duke Univ. Press 1997). 
 42  The European Court of Human Rights suggests that the capacity of a fetus to become a person 
 “ require[s] protection in the name of human dignity ” : Vo v. France, App. No. 53924/00, 2004 
Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 84.  See also the German abortion decisions in,  CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,  supra note 41, at 336 – 359. 
 43  The ruling was overturned on appeal.  See  JOHN KELLY, GERARD HOGAN & GERRY WHYTE, THE IRISH 
CONSTITUTION 719 (Butterworths 1994). 
 44  Beyleveld & Brownsword,  supra note 39, at 662. The French law was approved by the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee in Wackenheim v. France, Communication No 854/1999, 
 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (2002),  cited in Moon & Allen,  supra note 12, at 642. 
 45  Decision of the Cour d’Appel de Paris, May 28, 1996,  cited in  WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL.,  NATIONAL, 
SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW: SCOPE OF PROTECTION 184 (Hart 1998). 
 46  Jordan v. S. 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at para. 74, (O’Regan and Sachs, JJ.). 
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or  “ thick ” 47 conception of the good life may be problematic in constitutional law 
if it requires judges to choose between competing conceptions of the good life or 
restricts another value linked to dignity, namely, autonomy. 
 Kant’s moral writings link dignity, equality, and autonomy intimately. 48 
A rational being has the ability to act morally. This capacity to act morally 
confers a worth on the rational being that is beyond price and this  “ uncondi-
tioned and incomparable worth ” is termed dignity. 49 This leads to one version 
of the categorical imperative: that persons should not be treated merely as 
means but, rather, as ends in themselves. 50 For Kant,  “ Autonomy is therefore 
the ground of the dignity of human nature. ” 51 
 One interpretation of this idea may put the emphasis on the free choice of 
the individual regardless of circumstances. Dignity as autonomy has often 
been criticized as being too individualistic. 52 The notion may lead to justifying 
a minimalist laissez-faire state — Robert Nozick explicitly invokes the Kantian 
categorical imperative in developing his notion of a minimalist state. 53 An 
excessive focus on autonomy as free choice may condemn social protection 
measures as limiting free choice and so failing to respect dignity. 54 
 Although an individualistic emphasis on free choice may be one interpreta-
tion of Kantian dignity, it is not the only one. John Rawls connects Kant’s notion 
of treating persons as ends in themselves 55 to the  “ bases of social respect ” — how 
an individual feels valued in his or her community. 56 This is essential to an indi-
vidual’s self-respect, without which life may seem to lack value or meaning. 
 47  MICHAEL WALZER,  THICK AND THIN (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1994). 
 48  IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 434 – 440 (Hutchinson 
1948) (1785). 
 49  Id. at 436. 
 50  Id. at 429, 434. I am grateful to Joanne Conaghan of Kent Law School for a discussion on this 
aspect. For a South African judicial reference to the Kantian ideal see  Dodo v. The State 2001 (3) SA 
382 (CC) at para. 38. This version of the categorical imperative underpinned the decision of the 
German Constitutional Court to invalidate a law authorizing the shooting down of hijacked airlin-
ers. Oliver Lepsius,  Human Dignity and the Downing of Aircraft , 7  GERMAN L.J. 761, 767 (2006). 
 51  KANT ,  supra note 48, at 436. 
 52  DENNIS  DAVIS, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: TRANSFORMATION AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 78 
n.26 (Juta 1999). 
 53  ROBERT  NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 29 – 31 (Blackwell 1975). 
 54  For a view that human dignity is best protected by economic rights and trade agreements, see 
John McGinnis,  The Limits of International Law in Protecting Dignity , 27  HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 137 
(2003). 
 55  Teuber explains how Nozick and Rawls interpret Kant differently on this point. Andreas Teuber, 
 Kant’s Respect for Persons, 11  POL. THEORY 369, 370 (1983). 
 56  JOHN  RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62, 178, 440 (Oxford Univ. Press 1972). 
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Public arrangements that express contempt or, importantly, indifference to an 
individual’s life plans are not acceptable. 57 This more socially oriented notion of 
dignity incorporates both a subjective element (how the individual feels valued 
in the society) 58 and a more materialistic conception; for Rawls, an individual’s 
self-respect may be devalued if social goods are unequally distributed (unless an 
unequal distribution works to the beneﬁ t of the least advantaged in society). 
Such a view, rather than questioning the legitimacy of social protection meas-
ures, regards them as intimately linked to dignity. 59 
 A ﬁ nal, more materialistic conception of dignity again relates it to social 
goods. This notion eschews the subjective question of how a person feels; 
rather, it asks whether social goods are equally distributed to everyone’s mate-
rial beneﬁ t. The spirit of this approach is best captured in international human 
rights texts, which invoke  “ human dignity ” — in the sense of our common 
humanity 60 — to ground human rights and equality. Such texts then condemn 
any  “ distinction, exclusion or restriction ” that nulliﬁ es the  “ recognition, enjoy-
ment or exercise ” of rights in the  “ political, economic, social, cultural, civil or 
any other ﬁ eld ” on the grounds speciﬁ ed in the international texts, such as 
gender, race, or disability. 61 Aside from providing a foundation for our sense of 
common humanity, the idea of dignity may have little further function in 
this regard. 62 The focus is, rather, on an approach that, according to Justice 
Albie Sachs,  “ acknowledges that there are patterns of systemic advantage and 
 57  Id. at 338. This is closer to Kant’s own views.  See  KANT ,  supra note 48, at 423. 
 58  For commentary that dignity is perplexing in having these subjective and objective dimensions, 
see Feldman,  Human Dignity as a Legal Value – Part 1 ,  supra note 16, at 685 – 686. 
 59  In Germany, dignity requires the provision of a social welfare safety net. Starck,  supra note 17, at 
192 – 193. South African courts have emphasized the interrelationship between dignity, social se-
curity, and equality.  See, e.g. ,  Khosa v. Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) BCLR 568 
(CC). 
 60  Sandra Fredman,  From Deference to Democracy: The Role of Equality under the Human Rights Act 
1998 , 122  LAW Q. REV. 53, 72 (2006). 
 61  Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, art. 1, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979).  See also Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 1.1, G.A. Res. 2106  (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (Dec. 21, 1965); and 
Article 1 of the 2007 Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (not yet in force). 
 62  Such an approach may well not require dignity: Christopher Essert,  Dignity and Membership, 
Equality and Egalitarianism: Economic Rights and Section 15 , 19  CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 407 
(2006). 
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disadvantage based on race and gender that need expressly to be faced up to 
and overcome if equality is to be achieved. ” 63 
 Judicial considerations of dignity do not always clarify which conception of 
dignity is operative or, in the given circumstances, preferred. In the landmark 
case of  Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with a claim by a 
thirty-year-old woman that a statute denying her survivor’s beneﬁ ts because 
she was under thirty-ﬁ ve was discriminatory. Justice Frank Iacobucci discussed 
the idea of dignity in the context of section 15 of the Canadian Charter, elaborat-
ing a three-stage test for determining whether a measure was discriminatory:  
 •  Did the case involve a formal distinction or a differential impact? 
 •  Was it based on one of the grounds mentioned in section 15 of the Charter 
or an analogous ground? 
 •  If so, did it violate the purpose of the Charter? 64  
 In the third part of the three-stage inquiry, Justice Iacobucci explains that 
human dignity becomes crucial to the purpose of the Charter: 
 Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and 
self-worth. It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and 
empowerment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised 
upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual 
needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to 
the needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into ac-
count the context underlying their differences. Human dignity is harmed 
when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or devalued, 
and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and 
groups within Canadian society. Human dignity within the meaning of 
the equality guarantee does not relate to the status or position of an in-
dividual in society per se, but rather concerns the manner in which a 
person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law. Does the 
 63  More fully, Justice Sachs says: 
 “ Rather  … [the substantive approach to equality] focuses on whether it serves to advance or 
retard the equal enjoyment in practice of the rights and freedoms that are promised by the Consti-
tution but have not already been achieved. It roots itself in a transformative constitutional philoso-
phy which acknowledges that there are patterns of systemic advantage and disadvantage based on 
race and gender that need expressly to be faced up to and overcome if equality is to be achieved. In 
this respect, the context in which the measure operates, the structures of advantage and disadvan-
tage it deals with, the impact it has on those affected by it and its overall effect in helping to achieve 
a society based on equality, non-racialism and non-sexism, become the important signiﬁ ers.  ”  Min-
ister of Finance v. Van Heerden 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 at para. 142. Justice Sachs ’ approach to 
substantive equality in this passage does not refer to  “ dignity, ” though he later mentions it. He 
invokes it in different senses, including referring to the establishment of  “ national dignity ” achieved 
through the creation of a just society.  Id. at para. 145. 
 64  Law v. Canada (Minister of Immigration), [1999] 1.S.R.C. 497, para. 39;  see also paras. 75, 88. 
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law treat him or her unfairly, taking into account all of the circumstanc-
es regarding the individuals affected and excluded by the law? 65 
 This passage sets out a detailed analysis of what dignity means in the 
Canadian context while allowing for disagreement. Justice Iacobucci combines 
different conceptions of dignity. 66 The test mentions laws  “ premised upon per-
sonal traits ” that would offend autonomy. It asks how the claimant  “ feels ” he or 
she has been treated and whether that feeling is  “ legitimate, ” that is, whether 
there is a reasonable basis for a feeling that one’s dignity has been assaulted. 
The test refers to responding to the  “ needs, capacities and merits ” of persons 
and avoiding marginalization. This omnibus approach allows for much disa-
greement; scholars claim that it is too  “ abstract ” 67 and even  “ broad, malleable 
and loaded. ” 68 In several equality cases discussed below, the differences among 
the judges may be explained by the emphasis that some give to dignity as auton-
omy and others to the more social or materialistic conceptions of dignity. 69 
 2.  The concept of dignity in equality law 
 Dignity, given its multiple deﬁ nitions, may be applied in various ways in equality 
jurisprudence. 70 It may be brought up simply to underscore the importance of 
equality and nondiscrimination, without itself providing standards for decision 
making. Judges also may invoke dignity to identify the groups or classiﬁ cations 
that equality jurisprudence should concern itself with; alternatively, it may be 
used as a threshold criterion for determining when a distinction becomes unac-
ceptable. In cases where a nonsymbolic use of dignity is suggested, the concept 
often adds little to the legal analysis, which is based on more concrete notions, 
such as the need to combat particular forms of prejudice and stereotypes. 
 Canadian and South African judges have referred to the concept of dignity 
to expand the scope of their equality clauses. Section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes a comprehensive guarantee of equal-
ity, outlawing discrimination on a number of  “ enumerated grounds ” (race, 
religion, gender, age, etc.). Grounds  “ analogous ” to those enumerated are also 
 65  Id . at para. 53. 
 66  Sophia Moreau,  The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment , 54  UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 291, 318 – 320 (2004). 
 67  Grabham,  supra note 5, at 654. 
 68  Greschner,  supra note 5, at 312. 
 69  See section 3,  infra . 
 70  Other uses of dignity include extending discrimination law to cover harassment, or in deciding 
cases where rights conﬂ ict. Moon & Allen,  supra note 12, at 631, 644; Rosa Ehrenreich,  Dignity 
and Discrimination , 88  GEO. L.J. 1 (1999). Fredman also discusses the role of dignity in avoiding 
 “ levelling down. ”  FREDMAN ,  supra note 10, at 18. 
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covered; in  Corbiere v. Canada, the Supreme Court held that a ground is analo-
gous if it is used in a way to impair human dignity. 
 The ﬁ rst inquiry is whether the distinction is made on the basis of an enu-
merated ground or a ground analogous to it. The answer to this question 
will be found in  considering the general purpose of s. 15(1), i.e. to prevent the 
violation of human dignity through the imposition of disadvantage based 
on stereotyping and social prejudice, and to promote a society where all 
persons are considered worthy of respect and consideration. 71 
 In  Corbiere , a statute denied Aborigines living away from a reserve any vot-
ing rights relating to the reservation. The Supreme Court ruled that the status 
of being an  “ off reserve Aborigine ” was a ground analogous to those enumer-
ated in section 15 and, therefore, suspect. Like the enumerated grounds, it was 
a status often used in stereotypes and was not based on merit or personal cir-
cumstances but, rather, on a feature that is  “ immutable or changeable only at 
unacceptable cost to personal identity. ” 72 Finding there was a distinction based 
on an analogous ground, however, was not the ﬁ nal step in determining 
whether there had been improper discrimination. 73 The next step was to exam-
ine whether the distinction was discriminatory in a substantive sense, that is, 
whether it would impair a claimant’s dignity as outlined in  Law v .  Canada . 74 
The majority held that the statute, indeed, was discriminatory in the substan-
tive sense, nor was it justiﬁ ed under the limitations test in section 1, since a 
complete ban on participation by off-reserve Aborigines in the reserve political 
process was more than a minimal impairment of the right. 75 
 The Constitutional Court of South Africa also considers potentially discrimi-
natory certain distinctions, beyond those enumerated in section 9 of that 
country’s Constitution, if they are based, directly or indirectly, on grounds that 
possibly impair human dignity. 76 If such exists, then the Court must consider 
whether it is unfair. In deciding whether a speciﬁ c distinction on an unenu-
merated ground is improper, one of the factors that the Court considers is 
whether the measure impinges on the dignity of the persons affected. 77 
 While these courts mention dignity in expanding the scope of equality law, 
it is not clear that the concept is performing some actual function in furthering 
the courts ’ reasoning. The majority in  Corbiere refers to the concept of dignity, 
but the substantive work in deciding whether  “ off reserve Aborigines ” should 
 71  Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs), [1999] 2 S.R.C. 203 at para. 5 (emphasis added). 
 72  Id. at para. 13. 
 73  Id. at paras. 7 – 8. 
 74  Id. at paras. 8 – 11 (referring to Law v. Canada (Minister of Immigration), [1999] 1.S.R.C. 497). 
 75  Id. at para. 21. 
 76  Harksen v. Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC), at para. 46. 
 77  Id. at para. 51. 
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have voting rights is done by deciding whether the ground for this distinction 
is based on an immutable or personal characteristic that is difﬁ cult to change 
and is used to stereotype some people harmfully. These concepts can be 
explained without referring to dignity. 
 One of the main uses of dignity in comparative constitutional equality juris-
prudence is as a threshold requirement, enabling courts to separate distinc-
tions that are constitutionally improper from those that are not. The South 
African Constitution, for instance, does not prohibit discrimination generally, 
only unfair discrimination; in determining what is unfair, dignity is  “ an under-
lying consideration. ” 78 For example, a distinction among the owners of land in 
different areas for ﬁ re-control purposes does not affect human dignity and so 
does not constitute unfair discrimination. 79 
 This use of dignity also comes across in the guidelines developed by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in  Law v. Canada , the case dealing with survivor’s 
beneﬁ ts discussed above. 80 Integrating diverse strands from earlier cases, 81 the 
Court developed the three-stage test already explained. The third inquiry —
 compliance with the purpose of the Charter — embodies the idea of dignity. 82 
Justice Iacobucci identiﬁ ed a range of factors to consider under this heading, 83 
including preexisting disadvantage; the relationship between the grounds and 
the claimant’s  “ need, capacity or circumstances ” ; the ameliorative purpose of 
the legislation; the nature of the interest concerned; and whether the law oth-
erwise demeaned the dignity of the claimant. 84 
 In  Law , the distinction was based on the enumerated ground of age. Under 
the third stage of the test, the Court found there was no violation of human 
dignity because young people (without disability or dependent children) had a 
better chance of obtaining employment. Neither was there an improper stereo-
typing of people under the age of thirty but, rather, the distinction was related 
to the reality that a young person is better situated to replace the lost beneﬁ ts 
with earned income. 85 While  “ dignity ” provides the rubric, the concrete appli-
cation of the third stage of the  Law inquiry does the substantive work. 
 78  Robinson v. Volks 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at para. 79 (Ngcoco, J., concurring). 
 79  Prinsloo v. Van der Linde and Minister of Forestry and Water Affairs 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) at 
para. 41. 
 80  Law v. Canada (Minister of Immigration), [1999] 1 S.R.C. 497. 
 81  Judge Iacobucci refers to more than a dozen cases, starting with Andrews v. Law Society of 
British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; and including the decisions in Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 
418; Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; and Eldridge v. British Colombia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624. 
 82  “ It may be said that the purpose of s 15(1) is to prevent the violation of essential human dignity 
and freedom . . . . ” Law v. Canada, para. 51. 
 83  Id. at paras. 59 – 75. 
 84  Id. at para. 75. 
 85  Id. at paras 101 – 103. 
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 These Canadian and South African examples illustrate some ways in which 
judges typically refer to dignity at different stages in equality cases. Although 
dignity does not seem to do any substantive work in these examples, this is not 
so in all cases. As the next section illustrates, when judges rely on dignity to 
provide the rational underpinnings for a decision, the inherent ambiguities 
and resulting dangers of the concept become manifest. 
 3.  The dangers of dignity in an equality jurisprudence 
 Judges decide issues of equality based on speciﬁ c articulations of ideas regard-
ing stereotyping, personal characteristics, and the like.  “ Dignity, ” on the other 
hand, is an abstraction, and there is a great deal of leeway for unarticulated 
value assumptions to enter into judicial decision making. 86 What one person 
regards as an intolerable assault on human dignity, another may see as inci-
dental, as a part of everyday life. 87 What one person may see as a racist denial 
of dignity, another may see as legitimate afﬁ rmative action. Several Canadian 
and South African cases are illustrative. 
 In some situations, it is the relationship between dignity and autonomy that 
is problematic. For example, both South African and Canadian courts have 
dealt with allegations of discrimination against unmarried cohabiting hetero-
sexual couples vis-à-vis the rights granted to married cohabiting heterosexual 
couples. In the Canadian case of  Nova Scotia v. Walsh , 88 the distinction was a 
statutory presumption that matrimonial property should be divided equally 
between the spouses at the end of marriage; this presumption did not apply to 
unmarried cohabiting couples. In South Africa, in  Robinson v. Volks, a statute 
provided that a married person, on the death of a spouse, could apply for main-
tenance to be paid out of the deceased’s estate; this possibility did not exist for 
surviving members of unmarried cohabiting couples. 89 Both courts, over 
strong dissents, found there to be no unfair discrimination. 90 The majority 
stressed the need to respect autonomous choices; where a person or couple 
chose not to marry and to accept the legal consequences of marriage, these 
 86  FREDMAN ,  supra note 10, at 19. 
 87  For instance, in the South African case,  City Council of Pretoria v. Walker , the Council adopted a 
policy of not prosecuting residents of more deprived areas for nonpayment of utilities charges, but 
did prosecute residents of more afﬂ uent (predominantly white) areas. The majority found this poli-
cy to affect white residents  “ in a manner which is at least comparably serious to an invasion of their 
dignity ” (para. 82), but Justice Sachs, dissenting,  “ simply [could not] see how the complainant’s 
rights were affected or his fundamental human dignity impaired by his receiving a summons to pay 
for something that was due ” (para. 127).  City Council of Pretoria v. Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC). 
 88  Nova Scotia v Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325. 
 89  Robinson v. Volks 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
 90  Nova Scotia v Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 at para. 43;  Robinson v. Volks 2005 (5) BCLR 446 
(CC).at paras. 51 – 58 (Skweyiya J.) and at paras. 81 – 87 (Ngcobo, J.). 
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should not be imposed by a court. 91 The dissenters in both cases pointed out 
that free choice, in this sort of situation, was often an illusion. In particular, as 
Justice Sachs wrote, in the South African case, structures of gender discrimina-
tion that disadvantage women are not unique to marriage but also affect 
unmarried cohabiting couples. 92 The dissenters, arguing the frequent absence 
of choice in such cases, focused speciﬁ cally on the needs and welfare of disad-
vantaged persons in concluding that it is unfair to hold persons accountable 
for their decisions where their autonomy is more theoretical than real. The 
tension that these cases highlight — between an interpretation of dignity that 
mandates a protection of a person’s autonomy, or free choice, and one that 
mandates consideration for a person’s needs and welfare — reﬂ ects a signiﬁ cant 
divergence in the understanding of the concept of dignity. 93 Any human rights 
jurisprudence will require judges to make signiﬁ cant moral choices. 94 The 
competing interpretations of dignity, in particular, allow for unarticulated 
value judgments to determine their decisions. 
 The Canadian case of  Gosselin is instructive. 95 Between 1984 and 1989, 
Quebec operated a social welfare scheme for the unemployed; to those under 
thirty it paid two-thirds of the beneﬁ t that it paid to those over thirty. Persons 
under thirty could increase their welfare payments by participating in one of 
three government-designated work-activity or education programs. The aim 
of this legislative distinction was to encourage the young and unemployed to 
acquire education or training to better equip them to rejoin the workforce. The 
claimant sought to compel the provincial government to compensate fully peo-
ple under thirty. A divided Supreme Court of Canada rejected this claim, focus-
ing on whether the distinction violated the purposes of the Charter. 96 
 Applying the factors listed by Justice Iacobucci in the  Law case, Chief Justice 
McLachlin found that young people did not suffer from a history of disadvan-
tage; 97 moreover, they were probably better off than others regarding access to 
 91  Nova Scotia v Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 at para. 43;  Robinson v. Volks 2005 (5) BCLR 446 
(CC) at para. 93, (Ngcobo J.). 
 92  Robinson v. Volks 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at para. 163. 
 93  The tension is not limited to the equality context. One can imagine a case where an individual 
might refuse medical treatment but doctors would be allowed to invoke dignity to override this ex-
pression of free choice. Feldman cites such a case from France.  See Feldman,  Human Dignity as a Legal 
Value – Part 2 ,  supra note 16, at 68. Similarly, one can imagine multiple views, based on dignity, as 
to whether a prisoner on hunger strike should be force-fed.  See Starck,  supra note 17, at 187 – 192. 
 94  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 – 137 (Duckworth 1978);  RORY  O’CONNELL, LEGAL 
THEORY IN THE CRUCIBLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE (Ashgate 2000). 
 95  Gosselin v. Attorney General of Quebec, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429. 
 96  Id. at para. 19. 
 97  Id. at para. 32. 
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employment. 98 Further, a genuine relationship between the basis for the dis-
tinction and social reality existed; there was a problem of youth unemploy-
ment rooted, partly, in the lack of skills among some young people. 99 As far as 
ameliorative purposes were concerned, McLachlin found this criterion, when 
applied here, to be neutral. 100 As to the nature of the interests, McLachlin held 
that the legislature was trying to help younger people to develop skills; that its 
goal was to  “ promote the self-sufﬁ ciency and autonomy of young welfare recip-
ients. ” 101 She concluded that the statute did not impair the claimant’s dignity. 
 The dissenting judges dealt very differently with the third principle of the 
Law test. Justice Michel Bastarache gave a detailed overview of the claimant’s 
circumstances. She had to move house frequently, sometimes ate at soup kitch-
ens or her mother’s home, and suffered from a variety of medical problems. 102 
He noted that the social assistance scheme was premised on the problem of 
youth unemployment, indicating that young people suffered a preexisting dis-
advantage. 103 He observed an underlying assumption in the legislation, 
namely, that young people needed  “ punitive measures ” to encourage them to 
take up training opportunities. 104 Because the law expected young people to 
survive on an income below the ofﬁ cial subsistence level, exposing them to the 
threat of  “ deep poverty, ” 105 which might lead to malnutrition or even more 
dire circumstances, 106 the dissenters found a violation of section 15. Both the 
majority and dissenters said they were addressing the same question, that is, 
whether a reasonable young person under the age of thirty would experience 
the same impairment of dignity as an older citizen when denied subsistence 
beneﬁ ts. 107 
 98  Id. at para. 34. 
 99  Id. at para. 40. 
 100  Id. at para. 59. 
 101  Id. at para. 65. 
 102  Id. at paras. 164 – 170. 
 103  Id. at para. 238.  See also para. 137 (L’Heureux-Dube, J.). 
 104  Id. at para. 250. 
 105  Id. at para. 254. 
 106  Id. at paras. 130 – 131. 
 107  Gosselin highlights the concern that dignity (whether related to autonomy or self-respect) may 
suggest an interpretation of equality that is more sensitive to symbolic violations of dignity rather 
than to unequal distribution of material beneﬁ ts. (I am grateful to Sonia Lawrence of Osgoode Hall 
Law School for this point.) The Kantian sense of dignity is  “ unconditional ” and so, in one sense, is 
immune to being impaired by changes in material circumstances. Moreau,  supra note 66 at 295. 
In the language of political philosophers, it may focus too much on recognition and not on redistri-
bution.  NANCY  FRASER &  AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION (Verso 2001). 
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 Similar issues arise in another age discrimination case from Canada: 
 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada . 108 This case con-
cerns Canadian Criminal Code section 43, which permits parents and teachers 
to use reasonable force to discipline children. The Supreme Court upheld this 
section of the code as a basis for a defense against the charge of assault under 
the third stage of the  Law test; at the same time, it narrowed the scope of the 
statute. The majority interpreted the law to prohibit corporal punishment of 
children under two or over twelve years of age; the use of instruments; blows 
directed at the head; 109 and to limit teachers ’ use of force to situations in which 
they were restraining a child or removing a child from the classroom. 110 
 The majority found there was a correspondence between the circumstances, 
the needs of children, and the measure, when viewed in the overall context of 
state policy on corporal punishment. Consequently, there was nothing arbi-
trary or demeaning in the nature or enforcement of section 43. The Court said: 
 I am satisﬁ ed that a reasonable person acting on behalf of a child, ap-
prised of the harms of criminalization that s. 43 avoids, the presence of 
other governmental initiatives to reduce the use of corporal punishment, 
and the fact that abusive and harmful conduct is still prohibited by the 
criminal law, would not conclude that the child’s dignity has been offend-
ed in the manner contemplated by s. 15(1). Children often feel a sense of 
disempowerment and vulnerability; this reality must be considered when 
assessing the impact of s. 43 on a child’s sense of dignity. Yet, as empha-
sized, the force permitted is limited and must be set against the reality of a 
child’s mother or father being charged and pulled into the criminal justice 
system, with its attendant rupture of the family setting, or a teacher be-
ing detained pending bail, with the inevitable harm to the child’s crucial 
educative setting. Section 43 is not arbitrarily demeaning. It does not dis-
criminate. Rather, it is ﬁ rmly grounded in the actual needs and circum-
stances of children. 111 
 This view may be no more than a reﬂ exive assertion of a social perception 
that children should expect some corporal punishment from their parents. If it 
is more than that, it may highlight the ﬂ aws in an approach that stresses 
autonomy, particularly when dealing with cases involving children, who are 
not treated, ordinarily, as autonomous agents. The majority also considered 
the subjective element of the dignity test. While this is always an indeterminate 
approach, the majority explicitly emphasized the viewpoint of the guardian 
 108  Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76. 
 109  Id. at paras. 37, 40. 
 110  Id. at paras. 38, 40. 
 111  Id. at para. 68. 
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rather than that of the child. There were dissenting opinions both as to the rea-
soning and the result. Justices William Binnie and Marie Deschamps found 
that there was a violation of the equality clause: a law denying children the 
same protection offered to adults infringed the children’s dignity. 112 (Justice 
Binnie held that the distinction could be justiﬁ ed as a proportionate restriction 
on the right to equality, at least as regards parents vis-à-vis their children.) 113 
 It is not just in the Canadian cases that the reference to dignity may be based 
on the reﬂ exive assertion of accepted social norms. In  President of the Republic of 
South Africa v. Hugo, one of the earliest decisions of the South African 
Constitutional Court, the Court had to assess the validity of a presidential deci-
sion to pardon mothers of young children who were in prison but not fathers. 
The president based this on the special role of mothers in looking after chil-
dren 114 (though he may have been inﬂ uenced, as well, by the specter of releas-
ing large numbers of prisoners into a society worried about crime rates). 115 In 
upholding this decision, the Court observed that a constitutional ban on unfair 
discrimination reﬂ ected the constitutional purpose of achieving the  “ establish-
ment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and 
respect regardless of their membership of particular groups ” ; 116 however, it 
found no such discrimination in this case. It said that the jailed fathers had had 
their liberty curtailed through conviction and not by the presidential act. While 
they were disadvantaged in being denied a beneﬁ t offered to incarcerated 
mothers, they could still apply for remission. Therefore, according to the major-
ity, the measure had not impaired the dignity of the jailed fathers. 117 Justice 
Johann Kriegler dissented. He maintained that the state was relying on a stere-
otype regarding women’s position in society to justify the distinction made in 
the presidential decision. Relying on a gender-based generalization was itself 
an affront to dignity. 118 
 112  Id. at paras. 72, 220 – 232. 
 113  Justice Louise Arbour dissented on different grounds, ﬁ nding the legislation violated the section 
7 right not to be deprived of life, liberty, and security of the person  “ except in accordance with 
principles of fundamental justice. ” Justice Arbour was very critical of the majority’s decision to 
reinterpret the legislative defense from the law of assault, imposing safeguards not found in the 
legislative text, or even in the case law.  Id. at paras. 190 – 191. 
 114  President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para. 36. 
 115  Id. at para. 46. 
 116  Id. at para. 41. 
 117  Id. at para. 47, (Goldstone J.). Fagan has described the invocation of dignity in Hugo as a rhe-
torical ﬂ ourish. Anton Fagan,  Dignity and Unfair Discrimination: A Value Misplaced and a Right Mis-
understood, 14  S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 220, 223 (1998). 
 118  President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para. 80 (Kriegler J.). 
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 These cases suggest that the concept of dignity is sufﬁ ciently broad so as to 
allow judges to invoke unarticulated norms to decide difﬁ cult issues. This may 
reinforce stereotypes and prejudices rather than combat them. 
 4.  Conclusion 
 The temptation to link dignity with equality is strong. In fact, some of the inher-
ent difﬁ culties in the application of the concept of equality may lead some writers 
to invoke dignity; 119 still, the concept of dignity itself has similar problems. In 
many cases discussed here, the reference to dignity is redundant; the real work 
has been done by other ideas, such as the need to combat prejudice and stereo-
types and to recognize the needs of members of disadvantaged groups. In some 
cases, dignity has played a valid role in the analysis; nonetheless, the malleability 
of the concept makes it controversial. 120 Thus, dignity, rather than resolving the 
ambiguities that arise in equality discourse, is liable to create further problems. 
 Given that dignity often seems redundant or controversial, should we then 
jettison the concept? It may be too late. The concept may already be so embed-
ded in case law and legislation that it must be addressed. 121 If so, we will have 
to acknowledge its plasticity and ﬁ nd suitable ways to approach it. 
 Constitutional texts and jurisprudence are replete with concepts as vague as 
they are inspiring. Judges may be tempted to rely on vague concepts as short-
hand for what they perceive to be socially acceptable distinctions; nonetheless, 
they have a responsibility to impart more detailed content to these concepts. 
When the task of a judge in constitutional law is to determine whether certain 
existing practices are constitutional, it is becomes particularly necessary to 
specify in detail what  “ dignity ” involves, rather than relying implicitly on ref-
erences to what may be thought of as unassailably acceptable. 
 The deﬁ nition offered by Justice Iacobucci, although detailed, is problematic 
in that it requires imagining how a person may feel and if having that feeling is 
legitimate, which includes multiple subjective elements. As Fredman and 
Moreau have argued, encouraging judges to base decisions on what they think 
other people must be feeling does not give sufﬁ cient guidance to the content of 
dignity. 122 There is an air of unreality about a scenario in which a senior judge 
 119  Susie Cowen,  Can  ‘ Dignity ’ Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence? , 17  S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 
34, 48, 55 (2001). 
 120  “ … it is something of a loose cannon, open to abuse and misinterpretation; it can oversimplify 
complex questions; and it can encourage  … paternalism … . ” Beyleveld & Brownsword,  supra note 
39, at 662. In the Canadian Foundation for Children case, Justice Binnie similarly warned that 
dignity should not become an  “ unpredictable side-wind powerful enough to single-handedly blow 
away ” the protection of the law. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, at para. 72. 
 121  Moon & Allen,  supra note 12, referring to the UK’s Equality Act , 2006, c. 3. 
 122  Fredman,  supra note 60, at 72; Moreau,  supra note 66, at 318 – 320. 
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endeavors to understand how, a non-national, a child, or a prisoner may feel. 
When, as a result of this exercise in empathy, the judge announces that the 
non-national, child, or prisoner would not feel their dignity violated by an 
impugned measure, some skepticism is inevitable. 
 Even where the norms underpinning a notion of dignity are more effectively 
spelled out, people may reasonably differ on how it should be understood. The 
South African and Canadian decisions show different understandings of dignity 
at work. Some judges respect dignity by stressing the role of free choice, such as 
the free choice of an individual not to take advantage of a legal beneﬁ ts the status 
of marriage brings. Others may see the notion of free choice as possibly more prob-
lematic and, instead, hold that respecting dignity requires people be given the pro-
tections they need. These are value choices judges must to make (and make 
explicit) if they are to ﬂ esh out the content of abstract concepts. In identifying dif-
ferent interpretations of the idea of dignity (as well as equality), judges should 
make public and clarify the normative basis for the law employing these notions, 
and, in so doing, invite further public, political, and academic commentary. 
 If we must use the concept of dignity in equality law, then we need to avoid 
subjectivity; and while the importance of autonomy 123 should not be discounted 
the warning of the dissenting judges in  Walsh and  Robinson should be heeded. 
Autonomy is not a practical reality for everyone, and its full realization typi-
cally requires attention to the forms of hierarchy and disadvantage that exist in 
society. The speciﬁ c factors listed by Justices Iacobucci and Sachs, quoted in sec-
tion 2 above, may be useful in tackling problems of hierarchy and patterns of 
disadvantage (in the sense of systematic exclusion from community beneﬁ ts). 124 
A substantive equality jurisprudence must take into account the various 
mechanisms by which a hierarchy may develop (for example, by way of preju-
dice, stereotyping, unequal distribution of resources), 125 and it must promote 
the equal enjoyment of community beneﬁ ts. For all that it may be a more difﬁ -
cult undertaking than an approach that cloaks value judgments in a rhetoric of 
dignity, a valid dignity jurisprudence will be one that focuses on real questions 
of disadvantage. The concept of dignity may embrace these questions; however, 
its amorphous application runs counter to a ﬁ nely focused approach. 
 This paper does not argue against the right to dignity as such, much less 
against a right not to be subject to inhuman and degrading treatment. However, 
it argues that the fuzzy concept of dignity may not be a helpful addition to the 
development of an equality jurisprudence. If judges refer to it, they should spell 
out the norms underpinning their conception of it. While there is little harm 
 123  On self-determination, see Moon & Allen,  supra note 12, at 627. 
 124  See id. at 648. 
 125  Reaume identiﬁ es three types of harm to her speciﬁ c conception of dignity that are relevant to 
an equality analysis: prejudice, stereotyping, and  “ exclusion from beneﬁ ts or opportunities that 
are particularly signiﬁ cant because access to them constitute part of the minimum conditions for 
a life with dignity. ” Reaume,  supra note 10, at 672. 
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that can be done by invoking dignity to expand the scope of equality law, the 
same is not true when it is used to limit equality claims. In that context, unless 
ﬁ rmly anchored to ideas about prejudice, stereotypes, and disadvantage, 
a recourse to  “ dignity ” may actually hinder the quest for substantive equality. 
